Scoot to go where others failed

Courtesy AFP

Courtesy AFP

IT will happen, as it must. So it seems, but a matter of time. Scoot, the medium to long-haul low-cost subsidiary of Singapore Airlines (SIA) has made known its intention to extend its network to possibly include a destination as far away as London from Singapore. After all, London is a prime destination for SIA, and one that has helped it flourish in its early days, so it should be an encouraging start for Scoot to test the budget long-haul.

Scoot chief executive Campbell Wilson said: “The West is definitely on our cards.” Lest, you forget by definition it is a medium to long haul low-cost operator and think its fortune is confined to regional flights. It is eyeing the Middle East up to London.

Never mind the failure of others that tried, most memorably Hong Kong’s Oasis Airlines that inaugurated its route from Hong Kong to London in October 2006. The budget airline added Vancouver in June 2007, and won several awards that year including “World’s Leading New Airlines: and “Asia’s Leading Budget Airline” at the Annual world Travel Awards. But barely into its third year, it folded its wings in April 2008.

Another low-cost carrier that faced a similar fate was Canada’s Harmony Airways that ventured beyond North America from Vancouver to Manchester (UK) and planned to expand into Asia, eyeing in particular the China market. That was not to be, when the airline collapsed in 2007, three years after it repositioned itself for the long-haul.

More recent and closer to home is AirAsia’s subsidiary AirAsia X in yet another attempt to keep budget pioneer Freddie Laker’s dream alive. In fact, its first aircraft was named “Semangat Sir Freddie” (“Spirit of Sir Freddie”). The budget carrier operated from Kuala Lumpur to two European destinations – London and Paris, connecting traffic from other destinations such as Melbourne – which it has since suspended, together with others, but it continues to operate some shorter hauls. Parent airline AirAsia is unlikely to admit to its offshoot’s failure as being final as its chief Tony Fernandes had said it planned to return some day.

So is Scoot going where angels fear to tread or where the brave dare not go to prove it is not an impossible dream after all?

On a more optimistic note, it is certainly a welcome breath of the erstwhile spirit and vigor that characterised the success of SIA when as a new airline it quickly became the world’s most envied operator that could do things that others were reluctant or afraid to consider. Indeed, it is difficult to think of Scoot without parent SIA – a quiet overshadowing that sibling SilkAir has for years tried and still does to dispel, and into which increasingly 55-per-cent owned Tigerair is moving. While pedigree connections cannot guarantee success, experiential wisdom is not something to be scoffed at. The issue is also one of relevance. SIA is very much a premium carrier that has been pushed into venturing into the lower end by increased competition from low-cost carriers and by peer rivals that have sprouted budget subsidiaries, a good example being Qantas and its budget subsidiary Jetstar.

There are questions: Is the SIA stable getting a little crowded with intra competition even as Scoot and Tigerair now claim they are performing better with cooperation? Scoot and Tigerair will soon be combining their reservations systems. Can SIA define the market such that they do not overlap and that it merely shifts the business from one pocket to the other? The move seems to be towards more commonality. SIA’s Krisflyer perks are now open to customers of subsidiary carriers.

And the big question: Is it Scoot in its own right flying to London or is the operation under the SIA banner, the way it is so difficult to tell AirAsia X from parent AirAsia? But then, AirAsia is itself a budget carrier. Nevertheless, the bet is likely to favour the probability of SIA (driving Scoot) succeeding if anyone should finally succeed in the budget long-haul.

This is not forgetting that SIA itself has not had lemons in its basket – its failed stake in Air New Zealand, its lacklustre investment in Virgin Atlantic, and the premature termination of its all-business class flights. While its slow entry (or re-entry if you consider the short-lived non-stop Los Angeles and New York runs) into the premium economy (PEY) market may have been the result of an over-cautious retreat, its performance thus far may have also emboldened it to take a more adventurous approach. Additionally, the PEY is doing well on the Vistara joint-venture in India, even as Cathay Pacific, a forerunner of the new PEY, has decided to take it off Indian routes.

Besides, the climate for expansion is encouraging. Mr Wilson said: “We are on an upward slope towards profitability. We see yield maturity building over time and we are observing that across our routes.” The SIA Group has just announced Q1 (Apr-Jun) profit of S$111 million (US$81 million), an increase of S$72 million. Parent SIA made a profit of S$108 million compared to S$45 a year ago. Tigerair broke even. And Scoot recorded an operating loss of S$20 million, an improvement of S$5 million over last year. Passenger load factor for Scoot increased 2.9 percentage points to 81.4% on the back of increased passenger carriage by 11.0%, far exceeding the 6.9% capacity injection. And, of course, the industry is blessed with the continuing low costs of jet fuel.

What about the competition? Without any indication of AirAsia X’s resumption of the long haul services, Scoot has a pretty much open field although Norwegian Air Shuttle operates from Oslo and Stockholm to Bangkok. In fact, with airlines such as Garuda Indonesia offering low fares to London in the attempt to retain direct traffic between Indonesia and the UK, Scoot may become the alternative SIA in the competition. Mr Wilson said: “We might be a bit more niche when it comes to long-haul operations.” Generally, the budget market is driven by the dollar, and the niche factor, whatever Mr Wilson meant by it, may make the difference. But note how many a budget operator that came and went had always maintained that they were not like the others, and that too may be predicated on the expectations of long-haul travellers.

Nevertheless, it is invigorating news although Mr Wilson said the plan “is not immediate but it is not something we are closed to.” It has been almost 50 years since Sir Freddie founded Laker Airways in 1966, and it is still a field where few dare venture. We wish Scoot good luck when it finally happens, and hope it succeeds.

This article was first published in Aspire Aviation.

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Is budget long haul but a pipe dream?

Courtesy PA

Courtesy PA


Only days after announcing plans to launch transatlantic flights in five years, Ryanair retracted its position, abandoning the plans. In a statement, it said it “has not considered or approved any transatlantic project and does not intend to do so.” This ran contrary to the earlier announced approval by its board to mount budget flights between various European and US cities. Why the sudden turnaround?

The budget long haul challenge continues to entice entrepreneurs who dare go where others fear to tread. We hark back to the days when Sir Freddie Laker pioneered the low-cost model and Laker Airways took to the sky in 1977 flying between London Gatwick and New York’s JFK Airport. It went bankrupt in 1982.

Others have tried and failed. Most notable among them, Oasis Hong Kong Airlines that operated scheduled non-stop services from Hong Kong to both London Gatwick and Vancouver International Airport. Voted “World’s Leading New Airline” at the Annual Travel Awards 2007, Oasis folded its wings a year later, ending a three-year run. It went down the same path as Canada’s Harmony Airways which started services within North America in 2001, then mounted a service to Manchester in UK and announced plans to expand into Asia. It collapsed in 2007, a lesson that might have come too late for Oasis.

AirAsia X, which is an offshoot of Asia’s largest budget carrier AirAsia, commenced services in 2007, flying from Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia to the Gold Coast in Australia. It was a tactical move to build up Australian traffic feed into its subsequent services to London and Paris. Three years seem to be as long as such services could last. In 2012 AirAsia X withdrew its services to both European destinations, along with others including Delhi, Mumbai, Abu Dhabi, Tianjin (China) and Christchurch. It cited high fuel prices and taxes, and a weak market. But AirAsia X is keeping the dream alive with plans to reintroduce services to London and Paris, and adding other new destinations such as Sapporo in Japan. As recent as the end of last year, AirAsia chairman Tony Fernandes announced that “reopening of KL-London is definitely on the card.”

Courtesy Norwegian Air Shuttle

Courtesy Norwegian Air Shuttle

The latest foray into that arena is Oslo-based Norwegian Air Shuttle, which began services in 2013 to the US and Bangkok in Thailand. It has plans to also fly to Hong Kong and India. The airline, which has been profitable before flying long-haul, is reporting losses and blamed it on the costs of expansion and disputes with US regulators and competitors who aren’t too welcoming of its intrusion.

Yet the temptation to prove that the budget long haul formula can work is irresistible to many a visionary, to whom we must give credit for their derring-do. In a price sensitive market, it should work but it seems not for the long haul as the short haul. It is widely accepted that beyond four hours, at most five, passengers have different needs and their demands begin to change inversely to cost. For one thing they are likely to carry more bags and could do with some pampering to break the monotony of the journey. Harmony Airways boasted low-cost with full service, and Oasis Airlines too tweaked the Spartan low-cost model to include some element of that. But running an extremely lean outfit in an unpredictable environment of volatile fuel prices, uncertain travel demand, potential flight delays and cancellations, and unforeseen natural disruptions among other things, is a big challenge.

There are other factors such as aircraft utilization with quick turnrounds, fleet support in the event of delays and cancellations, and competition. Legacy airlines can no longer afford to ignore budget carriers as niche players outside their turf for the short haul, as they spawn offshoots to check the competition. Air France-KLM and Lufthansa introduced Transavia and Germanwings respectively to compete with the likes of Ryanair and easyJet. Australian flag Qantas carrier has its Jetstar brand. Even Singapore Airlines reputed for premium service is adding yet another budget carrier, Scoot, to its fold, the new carrier literally sharing the same arena with older sibling Tigerair although it is pitched as a medium-range operator. So if the competition heats up, you bet the big boys will flex their muscles.

It is so tempting for an airline such as Ryanair as it succeeds and grows to look for new opportunities. That it did not work for others in the past does not necessarily dictate the formula cannot work for Ryanair, which has succeeded in the short haul where many others too had failed. Others such as AirAsia and Norwegian Shuttle which have gone ahead are still testing the ground. Apparently Ryanair is treading carefully as it has been seven years since it first expressed the desire to cross the big pond in 2008. In the earlier announcement before it changed its mind, it said, quite rightly so, it would be “dependent on attaining viable long-haul aircraft”. Consider how when the oil price soars, budget carriers are the hardest hit. It will take another four to five years in Ryanair’s estimate for such an aircraft to emerge. The airline’s spokesman revealed that it was talking to plane manufacturers. So, again, the question: why the turnabout?

Is the answer close to what easyJet chief Carolyn McColl said about sticking to what it does best? Ms McColl reportedly told the BBC: “We have no intention to do long haul because we think it’s a different kind of business.” It would be too high a risk to change its short-haul strategy. But Ryanair chief Michael O’Leary is known for suggesting game-changing ideas, as revolutionary as “standing room only” flights and charging for the use of the aircraft loo, and for setting trends in the industry such as charging for printing a boarding pass at the airport, so we wait to be surprised.

Interestingly, a new “ultra low cost” concept is rearing its head. While an airline such as Qatar Airways is demonstrating that there is almost no limit to dressing up a premium product with its latest offering of a private cabin furnished like a hotel suite, a new airline in Canada, Jetlines, has big plans to offer rock-bottom airfares said to be below 40 per cent what rivals Air Canada and WestJet are charging. Jetlines chief David Solloway said the airline is ready to take to the sky. He cited Ryanair, easyJet and Allegiant Air as models. “The model of buying a seat and a seatbelt and only paying for goods and services each passenger may choose individually,” he said, “is known all over the world and is the fastest growing segment in the airline industry.”

Apparently some five million Canadians cross borders to board flights out of neighbouring US airports because of ultra low fares offered by US airlines such as Allegiant Air. Mr Solloway hopes to stem the outflow by offering not only very low fares but also the convenience of flying from the home base. The question is: How low can you go? So much for nomenclature. The only thing certain about Mr Solloway’s proposal is that Jetlines will be much cheaper than other Canadian carriers. He probably already knows that the leaner the model, the stricter is the demand on discipline and efficiency. And the best bet for survival is flying into secondary airports rather than the main hubs, though this is somewhat tricky considering customer preferences. You fly where customers want to go. Apparently Mr Solloway has done his homework. He said: “If you’re asking the question whether Canada could have a third airline, the answer is no. But if you ask whether Canada can support an ultra low-cost, low fare airline, the answer is overwhelmingly yes.”

While US carriers are trying to stop the thrust of Norwegian Air Shuttle, the same question may be asked of the budget long haul: Is there a market, if not ready but potential, for the business? There has to be something out there for the many enterprising founders since Freddie Laker to wager their millions. Yet as they came and went all too soon, something seemed to be missing in the formula. Or is the budget long haul but a pipe dream?

This article was first published in Aspire Aviation.

Competing to be the best: How reliable are survey readings?

Courtesy Cathay Pacific

Courtesy Cathay Pacific


SKYTRAX has named Cathay Pacific as the world’s best airline in 2014, displacing last year’s winner, Emirates. In second and third place are Qatar Airways and Singapore Airlines (SIA) respectively. Asian and Middle East carriers dominated the ranks of the top ten: Emirates (4th), Turkish Airlines (5th), All Nippon Airways (6th), Garuda Indonesia (7th), Asiana Airlines (8th), Etihad Airways (9th) and Lufthansa (10th). No American carrier was placed.

Are those really the world’s best airlines?

The winning airlines are unlikely to question the validity of any survey, as you can see how many of them are listing awards from all and sundry like a laundry list as endorsement of their good reputation. The corollary must be that if you accept the accolade willy nilly, so must you recognize one and all sideswipes.

Which leads to the next question: Is Skytrax the standard?

Skytrax claims its World Airline Awards to be “the global benchmarks of airline excellence”. The winners are decided by 18.85 million travellers from over 160 countries, and that should take care of any misgiving about the survey having an inadequate population and most importantly, the bias factor or its susceptibility to political influence.

Cathay CEO Ivan Chiu said: “The World’s Best Airline award is particularly important to us because it was decided by the votes of close to 19 million travellers from around the world.” Cathay was placed sixth last year and has won the award four times, previously in 2003, 2005 and 2009.

Emirates president Tim Clark said: “These awards are widely regarded as the industry’s benchmark for excellence. To be voted ‘World’s Best Airline’ by millions of discerning travellers is something… to be proud of.”

Qatar CEO Akbar Al Baker said: “These awards are highly rewarding as they are judiciously voted by passengers a true account of the overall experience felt by customers who have travelled with the airline.” Qatar won in 2011 and 2012.

Courtesy Etihad Airways

Courtesy Etihad Airways


However, Etihad’s withdrawal from participation apparently over differences in the methodology may tell a different story. Although it had never won, Etihad was consistently placed in the top ten in the past five years, ahead of Emirates in some years. Despite its withdrawal, Etihad was still ranked in this year’s survey because according to Skytrax, “an airline cannot be withdrawn from the World Airline Awards since these results are directly decided by customers.” That statement should add to the survey’s credibility, yet without taking sides and arguing the toss about fairness, one can only suspect and understand that the subjective nature of the survey (and of any survey) is naturally exposed to dissatisfaction, whether baseless or with reasons which may well be valid, the way that the Oscars results do not sit as squarely with a lot of people. Now and then you get an outstanding actor declaring his or her disinterest in the awards.

The issue is usually one of weightage and relevance of selection. However designed, the respondents may to some degree be steered by what is being asked. Take, as matter of curiosity, the 2014 Skytrax survey readings for the top ten. SIA is ranked ahead of Cathay for inflight entertainment, cabin cleanliness, First Class amenities, First Class cabin overall, seats in First, Business and Economy, and First Class meals; but close behind Cathay in other areas except for its noted absence for airport services, Business Class amenities and Business Class meals. Yet Cathay takes the cake.

It is encouraging to see breakthroughs by airlines such as Turkish and Garuda in a game dominated by the familiar big names. Interestingly, Turkish ranks above everyone else except Emirates and SIA for inflight entertainment. It is no surprise that Garuda tops for cabin crew, the epitome of Asian service culture, in a category swept by Qatar (6th) and nine other Asian carriers: Cathay (2nd), SIA (3rd), Asiana (4th), Malaysia Airlines (5th), EVA Air (7th), ANA (8th), Thai Airways (9th) and Hainan Airlines (10th). In like fashion, with the exception of KLM (8th) and Qantas (9th), the airport services category belonged to Asian carriers: ANA (1st), EVA (2nd), Thai (3rd), Asiana (4th), Cathay (5th), Korean Air (6th), Garuda (7th) and Dragonair (10th).

Yet, giving credit where it is due, one may question the appropriateness of comparing a carrier having limited global presence with others that are more exposed in the global arena, and how a population of largely local respondents compares with the wider global population. Hence it may be more meaningful to look at niche rankings, but we all love the sweeping titles of the best overall, don’t we? Even regionalized readings must be viewed in their proper context. The Qantas Group went ga-ga over Jetstar Airways’ win as best low-cost airlines in Australia/Pacific over AirAsia X (2nd), Scoot (3rd) and Tiger Airways (4th), but the world’s best is AirAsia followed by AirAsia X in second place ahead of Jetstar Airways (4th). Note how the preferences change when the population mix changes.

Who then really is the best overall? It may be difficult to say for sure one definite airline, and under the circumstances a wider reading of the top three or five or up to ten may be a more sensible assessment. The contest is to get into that magic circle of the elite.

Courtesy TODAY

Courtesy TODAY


Equally significant is the consistency over time. Airlines such as Cathay, Emirates, Qatar and SIA may pat themselves on the back for being there long enough to deserve their stripes. Narrow that down further, and you will see that only two airlines – Qatar and SIA – have been consistently placed in the top three in the past five years. Asiana had a good run from 2010 to 2012. Cathay was just outside in 4th place until it tumbled to 6th last year and bounced back to be this year’s winner. The wider reading should lead some airlines such as Qantas to ask why it has dropped out of the respectable club.

One survey alone cannot be definitive, hence winning across notable surveys may strengthen the reading. Compare the Skytrax results with Conde Nast Traveler’s assessment by its readers – based on the same principle of uninfluenced feedback – and you will begin to understand why. In its ranking for foreign carriers (outside America), Etihad is placed 4th behind Emirates (2nd) and ahead of Qatar (7th). Cathay is 7th, and the winner is SIA. Korean Air (8th) did better than rival Asiana (18th), and so did Japan Airlines (16th) over ANA (21st). The Conde Nast top ten includes Virgin Atlantic (3rd), Air New Zealand (5th) and Swiss International (10th).

Then there is the annual Airline of the Year award given by the Air Transport World (ATW) magazine. The criteria take into consideration financial performance (which debunks the myth that the world’s favourite airline is not necessarily the most profitable or even profitable) and visible leaps forward in services. However, naming only one winner can often lead to suspicions of political influence (the way that some beauty pageants are said to be when a winner is crowned) and the tendency to pass the honour around although airlines such as ANA (2007 and 2013) and Air New Zealand (2010 and 2012) had been named twice. Cathay (2006), SIA (2008) and Asiana (2009) had all had their turns. Delta Air Lines is ATW’s Airline of the Year 2014.

Several other magazines also dish out their own annual awards, which may be based on their readers’ feedback, or assessed by a panel of judges or arrived at combining the two methods. Some of them target niche markets such as awards that recognize the best airline for business travel. That in a way avoids spillover or halo effects and sectarian prejudices as, for example, an airline that impresses in First and Business Class may pay scant attention to what happens in Economy.

Nevertheless, surveys are useful tools in maintaining competition. Everyone loves to win, unless you do not give a hoot about how the world sees it and how that may affect your bottom line. So too, everybody loves a winner; but that is no guarantee that the traveller will necessarily fly with the named best airline. Without downplaying their influence on the market, such awards probably mean more to the airlines than the travellers.

This article was first published in Aspire Aviation.

Europe’s aviation challenges

HOPE of Europe-based airlines bouncing back into good times on the back of an improved economy is not turning out to be as expected. Much of the good news reported last year seems to be short-lived.

Air France-KLM is among the airlines that have issued profit warnings, even though it expects higher earnings compared with 2013. The issue is the trending back down in growth. The airline is expecting to fall short of the forecast with revenue falling from 2.5 billion euros (USD 3.39 billion) to between 2.2 billion and 2.3 billion euros. It has cited rising competition from other carriers on the long-haul especially to North America and Asia, over-capacity as a consequence of the competition, weak cargo demand, and currency restrictions in Venezuela for the negative impact on its profitability.

Courtesy Reuters

Courtesy Reuters


Lufthansa has already announced a similar profit warning ahead of Air France-KLM. The German flag carrier is expecting lower than forecast profits – 1 billion euros compared to a high of 1.5 billion euros. Consequently it is also reducing its 2015 earnings forecast from 2.65 billion euros to 2 billion euros. Also citing competition for its woes, Lufthansa faces the same currency restrictions in Venezuela, which would reduce its profitability by 60 million euros. Additionally, the airline was plagued by a pilot strike in April that cost it another 60 million euros. The slowdown is evident in reduced seats offered over the winter, according to Lufthansa chief financial officer Simone Menne.

Irish airline Aer Lingus has also issued a warning on reduced profits estimated to be 10 to 20 per cent lower than last year’s, following a strike by cabin crew last month that caused disruption to some 200 flights and, according to a statement issued by the airline, “significant damage to Aer Lingus’ trading and forward bookings for several months into the future.”

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) was optimistic about a positive year for the global industry, expecting 2014 profits (US$3.2 billion) to almost double that of 2013 (US$1.7 billion). Although it has revised its forecast a little downward on account of new uncertainties in fuel prices as a consequence of geopolitical risks threatening Ukraine and the Middle East, and of capital outflows moving away from emerging economies largely to a strongly revived US economy, it will still be a much better year globally. But compared with other regions, the latest performance statistics for June showed that breakeven load factors are highest in Europe – the result of low yields and high regulatory costs. So, even though the region scored the second highest load factors, its financial performance fell behind the United States, the Middle East and Asia Pacific.

Of the top 10 countries ranked by the number of international passengers identified by IATA, five are in Europe: United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, France and Italy. About a quarter of the world`s tourist arrivals are concentrated in Europe (excluding Russia). Yet the situation is not all that rosy. The weakness of Europe seems to stem from inherent issues that have caused home airlines to direct their umbrage at the competition posed by foreign carriers, rather than the other way around as impacted first by external factors.

While foreign carriers in the Middle East and Asia Pacific have often been accused of unfair competition from a lower cost base and in some cases allegedly supported by government subsidies, the corollary is that airline operations in Europe are faced with high costs that include wages and airport charges, high taxes, cumbersome regulations and the propensity of costly industrial strikes. Some of the costs are levied directly on air travellers or through the airlines, since invariably the fees are passed on to the passengers. The UK is notorious for the suite of fees, among them the Air Passenger Duty which continues to escalate and which has become a significant source of revenue for the authorities. A new carbon tax would have been introduced in 2013 if not for the protest by the international community.

Courtesy Etihad Airways

Courtesy Etihad Airways

On the competition posed by foreign carriers, the biggest threat appears to come from cash-rich Middle East airlines. When Lufthansa`s newly appointed CEO Carsten Spohr took over the helm in May, he identified the Gulf carriers as the most daunting challenge for his tenure, and that tackling this would be a priority for him. The Gulf carriers are widely recognized as the big three in the Middle East, namely Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways. Mr Spohr suggested that Gulf carriers are not competing on a level playing field. The rate at which Etihad picked up stakes in European carriers (and around the world) has raised concerns of a Middle Eastern dominance that would be detrimental to their survival. Among the carriers that Etihad has bought into are Air Berlin, Air Serbia, Darwin Airlines and most recently Alitalia. Etihad`s CEO James Hogan defends his airline`s strategy as one of rescuing ailing European carriers on the brink of collapse, though not denying it is at the same time seeking growth through partnership.

Yet, to be fair, European carriers themselves have seen much consolidation among themselves too. Air France and KLM have merged. Lufthansa owns Swiss International. British Airways, Iberia and Vueling make up the International Airlines Group. According to IATA, improved profitability in Europe may be attributed in part to efficiencies brought about by consolidation, not necessarily among airlines within the region itself but also across borders such as the partnership between British Airways and American Airlines and the acquisition of a 49-per-cent stake by Delta Airlines in Virgin Atlantic. But it is a hard fact to swallow when, as an example, Air France-KLM could have had upped their ante in Alitalia and become majority stakeholder but have had their stake reduced substantially instead with the participation of Etihad.

Mr Hogan said: “Gulf carriers are not the cause of Europe’s aviation challenges.” Rather, an airline like Etihad has seized the opportunity availed by the region’s weakness, itself blessed by its rich resources and thanks no less to Europe’s liberal aviation policies for which it (Europe) should be commended.

European carriers have said that the competition has forced down ticket prices and resulted in over-capacity. It is easy to see what happens to margins if costs are not similarly managed, Interestingly Lufthansa sees the answer in low-cost services to be launched to Asia and possibly extended to Australia, packing in more seats in its wide-body jets to lower seat costs which will in turn mean lower fares. The elusive dream of a viable budget long-haul in spite of the failed Hong Kong-London run by Hong Kong’s Oasis Airlines and the short-lived services to London and Paris from Kuala Lumpur by AirAsia X continues to lure. Norwegian Air Shuttle became the latest operator to take up that challenge when it launched services from London’s Gatwick Airport to Los Angles, Fort Lauderdale and New York. But Norwegian’s derring-do is on a different plane as Lufthansa’s strategy aimed at countering the cheap fares offered by the competition, that if you can’t beat them, join them and hopefully beat them at their game.

On that score, Lufthansa may have already been defeated if Mr Spohr is thinking of targeting the Gulf carriers, which have so far deemed it not necessary to go down that road which continues to be lined with the usual financial risks of high costs and low yields, and the traveller’s reservations about the lack of basic creature comforts for the long hours of flying. It is therefore not the safest of bets for Lufthansa.

Mr Spohr has not decided whether Lufthansa would go it alone or join hands with Turkish Airlines. There is a redeeming feature here. Turkish and Istanbul’s Ataturk Airport could be the challenge to Gulf carriers and Dubai International in the race to be the hub connecting Europe and the rest of the world with some help. This is the kind of counter move that can really reshape the competition rather than merely playing the same game that has been mastered by the competitor.

This article was first published in Aspire Aviation.

The lure of the budget long-haul dream

THE elusive dream of the budget long haul continues to lure the few venturists who are bold enough to go where others had failed and many would shun, ever since Sir Freddie Laker launched the first such service in 1977. The Laker Airways flight flew from London Gatwick Airport to New York’s JFK Airport, a journey that would take some eight to nine hours, double the conventional budget standard. Laker ceased operations five years later.

It is a bigger dream today, to fly budget long-haul over a greater distance, say, between Europe and Asia.

Notable failures that followed include Hong Kong’s Oasis Airlines that operated services from Hong Kong to London and to Vancouver. It launched its first commercial flight in 2006 and ceased operations two years later. That it was voted “World’s Leading New Airline” at the Annual World Travel Awards in 2007 did little to save it from falling over the edge. A subsidiary of Malaysian budget carrier AirAsia based in Kuala Lumpur, AirAsia X which introduced services from Kuala Lumpur first to London in 2007 and then to Paris had a relatively short run too when it suspended operations in 2012.

Courtesy Norwegian

Courtesy Norwegian


Norwegian Airlines became the latest operator to take up that challenge when it launched thrice-weekly services from London’s Gatwick Airport to Los Angles, to be followed by flights to Fort Lauderdale and New York.

So it looks like what’s in there for pioneer Laker and his followers is but a commendable dash of derring-do!

Not quite the same story for established carriers faced with the stiff competition posed by rivals offering lower fares. Singapore Airlines launched Scoot (which in reality is still very much a short to medium range operator). Air Canada launched Rouge for services from Toronto to the Caribbean and to Europe with its eye also set on Asian destinations. Lufthansa has announced plans to launch similar services to Asia and possibly to Australia as well, packing in more seats in its wide-body jets to lower seat costs which will in turn mean lower fares.

Lufthansa’s CEO Carsten Spohr has taken issue in particular with the competition posed by the Gulf carriers – Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways – which, advantaged by lower cost bases and plenty of cash, he alleged, are not competing on a level playing field. But if it is a matter of joining them when you can’t beat them, hopefully to beat them at their game, it is clear that Lufthansa and the like are no longer in command of the market.

Emirates’ Airbus order cancellation raises questions

Courtesy Airbus

Courtesy Airbus


THE cancellation of an order for 70 Airbus A350 aircraft amounting to US$16 billion (based on 2007 list prices) by Emirates Airlines has turned the focus on the Airbus company. In an obvious attempt to play down the drama, Airbus chief operating officer (customers) John Leahy said: “It is not the world’s greatest news.” That did not check Airbus shares from falling 3.7 per cent and engine maker Rolls-Royce by 1.7 per cent on the back of Emirates’ decision. Mr Leahy even brushed it aside as if it was something to be expected, adding that Emirates president Tim Clark “does change his mind from time to time.”

In truth, airlines do change their mind about aircraft orders. In 2012, Qantas cancelled orders for 35 Boeing Dreamliner jets worth US$8 billion following a net loss of US$256 million – its first annual loss since 1995 when it was privatised – and expected lower growth requirements. The Australian flag carrier is keeping its fleet options open. Qantas CEO Alan Joyce said: “We will maintain complete flexibility over the fleet.” He explained: “In this business there is always potential for great headwinds and tailwinds… there is no intention that every aircraft is guaranteed to come or that it’s not going to come.”

Only very recently did budget carrier Tigerair – which is 40-per-cent owned by Singapore Airlines – also cancel orders for nine Airbus A320 aircraft in light of perceived overcapacity in the region of its operations.

But a decision by Emirates which is not in the same financial straits as Qantas and Tigerair must raise questions even as Mr Leahy insisted that he was “not particularly worried at all.” To suggest that it was a whim of Mr Clark was quite unwarranted. But Airbus did express its disappointment. Apparently, Emirates’ decision followed ongoing discussions between the two parties as the airline reviewed its fleet requirement. In fact, Emirates has ordered an additional 50 A380 aircraft.

Courtesy Airbus

Courtesy Airbus

So, naturally, we ask the big “Why?” and speculate on the ramifications of that decision.

Is Emirates dissatisfied with the aircraft model?

Allegedly Emirates is unhappy with particularly the performance of the A350-1000 model, which makes up 20 of the 70 aircraft orders, the others being the A350-900 model. Even as Airbus said Rolls-Royce was working on the upgrade, the writing was already on the wall when in November 2012, Mr Clark told Aviation Week that Emirates’ order for the aircraft was in limbo, and that the A350-900 “is starting to look a bit marginal to us because of its size.” That provided another perspective to the issue – one of suitability. Mr Clark explained: “Gauge is the way we grow, you cannot get any more aircraft into the Dubai hub.”

Has Emirates over-estimated its growth capacity?

The focus is so much on Airbus that it has become convenient to not ask any question that may suggest that Emirates’ decision is driven by more an internal than an external situation, or at least in part due to it. It is almost unthinkable in light of Emirates’ sterling performance when it posted a 43-per-cent increase in profit to Dh3.3 billion (US) for financial year 2013-14. According to Emirates chairman and chief executive officer Shaikh Ahmad Bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the airline’s profit margin was more than double that of the industry, the result of flying 44.5 million passengers – up 13 per cent – and close to a 80-per-cent load factor. It was a year of expansion as the airline increased its capacity for both passenger and cargo, and as it added new destinations across the globe.

By all accounts it does not look like Emirates is about to stop expanding, or even slowing down, despite the revised forecast by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) that showed astagnation in profitability for the industry in Africa and a dip for all the other regions with the exception of North America. Of course, the state of the industry does not necessarily reflect the fortune of Emirates, which in the past year has experienced healthy growth in all the regions that it operates. Still, the question must be asked: Has Emirates over-estimated its growth capacity, noting too the limitations of Dubai Airport? To be sure, the airline will continue to expand, having announced plans to add five new routes to Abuja, Brussels, Chicago, Kano and Oslo, but perhaps at a slower rate. It could be in this context that Shaikh Ahmad recognized the need for “efficient new aircraft” amongst other things to sustain profitability,

Will Emirates’ decision affect other airlines’ orders?

Courtesy Airbus

Courtesy Airbus

Emirates’ decision raises questions on the impact it may have on other airlines with similar orders, more notably the Gulf carriers namely Etihad Airways (with an order for 40 A350-900s + 22 A350-1000s) and Qatar Airways (43 + 37). Besides Etihad and Qatar, airlines that have placed orders include Air France-KLM (25 A350-900s), Aer Lingus (9 A350-900s + 9 A350-1000s), Aeroflot (14 + 22), Air China (10 + 10), AirAsia X (10 + 10), Asiana Airlines (12 +10), Cathay Pacific (20 + 26) and Japan Airlines (18 + 13). But Mr Leahy of Airbus was confident that other airlines would take up the slots vacated by Emirates. He maintained that there would “no hole in production” and therefore no impact financially since the first deliveries were only planned for 2019 and spanned out to 2034.

Is Emirates setting the stage for heightened competition between Airbus and Boeing?

This is not a new story about the rivalry between Airbus and Boeing, but more a reminder of it. It is all the more significant when Emirates is the world’s largest operator of the Boeing 777 and Airbus A380 in a fleet of 217 aircraft. In 2013-14, it received 24 new aircraft including 16 A380s, six Boeing 777-300ERs and two Boeing 777Fs. If there is a customer that both manufacturers want to please most, it has to be Emirates. Airbus is unlikely to let Emirates’ concerns go unattended even though the latter had cancelled its order; that will become history. For Airbus, it is more than just about losing an order. More importantly, it is about the competition with Boeing. Clearly, he who pays the piper calls the tune.

It was by the size of Emirates’ order a big deal after all, and Emirates is one of the world’s leading airlines. Mr Tim Clark may well have the last laugh.

Can AirAsia X succeed the second time round?

Courtesy AirAsia

Courtesy AirAsia

AirAsia X, the long-haul offshoot of Malaysian budget carrier AirAsia, plans to revive its European operations. It commenced operations from Kuala Lumpur to London in 2009 and to Paris in 2011, a bold move following the collapse of Hong Kong’s Oasis Airlines in 2008. But AirAsia X’s inability to sustain the operations, which were suspended in 2012, continued to cast doubt on the viability of the budget business for the long haul.

Announcing the carrier’s order for 25 twin-engine Airbus A330 aircraft valued at US$6 billion, AirAsia chief executive Tony Fernandes said: “It’s time to really take that next step and build the equivalent of an Emirates in the low-cost arena.” He added: “The world doesn’t wait.”

Apparently the older aircraft that AirAsia X previously used were not economical. Will AirAsia X be more successful in its “next step” with the new equipment? The jury is still out on this as the economics must depend on the demand given the state of the global economy, volatility of the fuel price, the preference of consumers vis-à-vis not just the cost of flying but the value of such a proposition. Not quite sure about the world not waiting, but it is also known that fools rush in where angels fear to tread.

Interestingly, Mr Fernandes is ditching its nemesis Singapore Airlines (SIA) for Emirates as the model to emulate. He may have just sounded a timely alert to SIA on the way the competition is shifting in the bigger arena.