Joon’s failure re-validates old lessons

Courtesy Getty Images

In just a year after its launch, Air France is shutting down its low-cost subsidiary airline Joon which promised to carve out a new niche market among millennials. The reason, said Air France, is because the brand had been “difficult to understand from the outset.”

Strange as that may sound, it shows how a major player like Air France itself has failed to understand the market forces at play. Or, an ill-timed miscalculation of the market trend.

A little history is appropriate here. When budget travel first emerged on the scene, legacy airlines were inclined to dismiss the upstarts as unlikely competitors, believing their markets to be markedly different. The established carriers, so to speak, were not interested in the budget market and were quite happy to let low-cost operators be.

The failure of many an ambitious budget carrier supported that view, particularly at a time when the volatile fuel price moved like a yo-yo but largely trending upwards. That hit the budget carriers hard since fuel is a significant component of their cost, and cost is all that budget travel is about.

But some like Ryanair and easyJet survived the storm and made good progress. That was when the big boys decided they too wanted in on a flourishing market. A number of them set up their own budget arms, such as United Airlines’ Ted and Delta Air Lines’ Song. They didn’t last long.

As the line of competition began to blur with low-cost carriers soon attracting business away from the traditional sources, more legacy airlines carried the battle cry into the fray. Among them, British Airways which started Go, which it later sold; Singapore Airlines (SIA) which went into partnership with Ryanair to start Tigerair; and Qantas which set up Jetstar.

The budget threat heightened with low-cost carriers venturing into the long-haul. There were casualties along the way, a notable one being Oasis Airlines which flew from Hong Kong to London as well as Vancouver. Hailed as a trail blazer for good service on a shoe-string budget, it could not survive the barrage of rising costs.

But that didn’t stop others to boldly go into a domain dominated by full-service airlines, a move which many observers thought was foolhardy. Today, low-cost carriers such as Norwegian Air Shuttles, Wow! Air and AirAsia continue to rattle the hitherto safe market of the Goliaths.

It seems independent low-cost carriers are more successful than budget offshoots of legacy airlines with few exceptions such as Jetstar. Why so is this? The failure of Joon only serves to revalidate the lessons of past failures.

The overall market has shifted from one distinct full-service vs budget scenario to a common market for all airlines. For many travellers, it is a conscious choice between legacy and budget carriers, the consideration not so much in name as in value for what it costs. For many travellers, the comfort and convenience of full-service still outweigh the savings of flying budget, particularly for the long haul. But for a growing number too, despite the higher risk of flight disruptions by low-cost carriers, why not?

Studies have shown that millennials have different priorities, and the budget model of paying for only what you want may have some appeal as it means control over how you spend your money. The new and younger travellers are more adventurous and not averse to taking chances.

The shift in the market is becoming more evident in how legacy airlines are in fact no longer completely full-service as they used to be, adopting increasingly the budget pricing model in charging for ancillary services what used to be part of the package deal, such as seat selection, priority boarding, and checked baggage.

It is not a given that a successful legacy airline will be as successful in operating a budget subsidiary. On the contrary, it faces the challenge of separating the two entities to operate them on their own terms. Too often this may be compromised with the parent airline subsidising the struggling offshoot. At the same time, the parent’s product may be diluted.

Much as the parent airline likes to maintain its distance and many of them have declared that their budget offshoots are running on their own steam, the reality is far from being so. Their influence is inevitable, however indirect and unintended. That may lead to tweaking the low-cost model to be less budget and more a copy of the old block, resulting in higher costs.

This is also not helped by the expectations of the customer when the budget offshoot carries the association with the reputable parent’s brand name. For example, while SIA has earned the reputation of being one of the world’s best airline, the same could not be said of Tigerair whose customers were sadly disappointed when the carrier ran into frequent bad patches.

What can be worse is when the budget subsidiary begins to compete with the parent company for the same low-end business.

American carriers however have found a solution to that: instead of operating separate budget offshoots to compete with independent low-cost carriers, they have introduced basic economy fares with similar terms to be accommodated within the same aircraft. The practice of offering different fare types even within the same class of travel is not new, but basic economy is aimed at keeping customers who may switch to budget carriers. And the model is gaining popularity across the industry.

Some observers may think Air France’s decision to shut down Joon premature as it has not allowed the latter time to grow. But not being clear about the product or the direction it is heading, it would be a hazy road ahead. It might as well nip the problem in the bud.

Advertisements

Why would IAG be interested in acquiring Norwegian Air Shuttle?

Courtesy Norwegian Air Shuttle

The International Airlines Group (IAG)’s interest in acquiring a stake in Norwegian Air Shuttle reflects the rising threat of the budget long-haul. Norwegian is among the few budget carriers that have broken the barriers to take budget operations beyond the limits of the 4-hour convention.

The competition is felt especially on the trans-Atlantic routes, where Norwegian and WOW air have made waves and which in turn have spawned budget offshoots by European legacy airlines, among them Lufthansa’s Eurowings, Air France’s Joon and British Airways (BA)’s Level as well as caused some carriers on both sides of the pond to introduce basic economy fare on their flights.

In fact, IAG which owns BA, Iberia and Aer Lingus, already has a Spanish budget arm known as Vueling. Yet why would it be interested in acquiring Norwegian?

Let’s face it: A legacy airline’s budget offshoot is understandably never quite like an independent budget operator. Otherwise the like of Level should have no fear of the competition posed by the like of Norwegian. Unfortunately the influence of the parent airline, however unintended, may be hard to disguise, and this could be the hitch.

Apparently IAG had already acquired a minority 4.6% stake in Norwegian. And if IAG seeks to increase its interest in the budget long-haul carrier, it may be seen as an attempt to “normalize” the playing field by the rules of the big guys. It would be a dent in the competition, if not eliminating a threat, at least limiting its influence.

Does Air Berlin’s demise signal end of the road for budget carriers?

Courtesy Reuters

Air Berlin is folding up its wings, caused by falling pasxsenger numbers. Last month alone saw a dip of 25 per cent compared to July last year. Its biggest shareholder, Gulf carrier Etihad Airways which owns a 29.2 per cent stake, is not forthcoming with the needed financial support.

Does Air Berlin’s demise signal the end of the road for unaffiliated budget carriers, many of whom are benefitting from the currtent low price of jet fuel? Or that it is at least a forewarning of a more difficult time ahead for them in the continuing battle between them and legacy airlines which are at the same time supported by their own budget offhsoots?

That’s what Ryanair fears, accusing the German government and national carrier Lufthansa of conspiring to carve up Air Berlin. Ryanair said: “This manufactured insolvency is clearly beign set up to allow Lufthansa to take over a debt-free Air Berlin which will be in breach of all known German and EU competition rules.” A Lufthansa-led monopoly, it said, would drive up domestic fares.

How then will the game play out after Air Berlin?

Ryanair’s apprehension as a competitor is real. Air Berlin’s exit will mean a stronger Lufthansa and its budget offshoot Eurowings. Yet already Lufthansa is a dominant player with 76 per cent of its capacity focused on the German market. The Lufthansa Group posted record earnings for the first six months of 2017, increasing revenue by 12.7 per cent to €17 billion and net profit by 56.6 per cent to €672 million. Eurowings and other airlines in the Group including Austrian Airlines, Brussels Airlines and Swiss Interantional Airlines, also posted positive results. So as a group, Lufthansa has quite some msucle to flex in Europe, and the vacuum left by Air Berlin is likely to be filled by Eurowings.

On the other hand, it may be countered that competition is all but dead since airlines such as Ryanair and EasyJet also have access to the German market. However, comparatively, their market share is small; Germany represents only 7 per cent of Ryanair’s capacity and 9 per cent of EasyJet’s. There is possibility that Air berlin’s demise may mean more demand for seats on these carriers, if not opening up the market for more competition. Hence the German government has denied Ryanair’s accusation that it had breached anti-trust rules.

Clearly the competition will intensify, whether it is a battle between legacy airlines and unaffiliated low-cost carriers or one between budget airlines themselves is not any more a matter of note. The competition has levelled, with budget carriers attempting to do more and legacy airlines even adjusting down to match. Legacy airlines including Lufthansa, British Airways and Air France are fighting back, and the old strategy of doing it through a subsidiary equivalent is receivign a revival. Besides Lufthansa, British Airways (as part of the International Airlines Group which is already supported by Spanish low-cost carrier Vueling) has introduced Level, and Air France annoucned plans to launch Joon which, however, it says, is not a low-cost carrier.

The competition does not stay the same for long in the aviation business. Little surprise that Etihad has decided to step back from its acquisition spree.

Joon: Basic yet chic

Courtesy Air France

What’s basic yet chic? That, says Air France, is the design of the uniform for cabin crew of its new subsidiary airline, Joon. You can expect to serve flight attendants in trendy casuals that include blazers, polos, ankle pants and sneakers. Apparently it is Silicon Valley inspired.

A statement issued by Air France said: “Its visual identity is based on an electric blue colour code symbolizing the airline’s dynamic attitude, as well as the sky, space and travel.”

Believe it, the colour has much to do with the kind of image projected by the airlines. Targeting millennials, Joon moves away from the convention of a neutral and sedate hue for something more in line with the outgoing disposition of younger jet-setters.

Many years ago when Singapore Airlines (SIA) launched a regional carrier called Tradewinds, there was much ado about the crew uniform to project the more casual mood of leisure travel – something you might wear on a vacation. That changed when its successor SilkAir took over to target business travel and other more serious travellers as well.

Courtesy Scoot

But it is Joon that is going completely millennial, right down to white trainers.

Courtesy Air Canada

Meantime, Air Canada is going retro. Its maple leaf logo design returns to the airline’s look 24 years ago, incorporating the circle loop. Black replaces red in the letterings on the aircraft, and flight attendantswill match with black uniform highlighted with a red tie or scarf.

Looks like you either go hip or nostalgic if you want to make a statement.

What do millennials want?

Courtesy Air France

Air France may have struck it right in launching Joon as a “lifestyle brand” targeting millennials, designed to meet the requirements and aspirations of a young working clientele whose lifestyles revolve around digital technology.

Goodbye baby boomers, hello millennials!

Air France defines the new generation of travellers as aged between 18 and 35 years. Quite aptly, the name Joon is a play on the French word “jeune”, which means “young”.

What do millennials want, travelling?

Millennials are IT-savvy and rely on electronic tools and applications going about doing the things they do. For them, for example, a paper boarding pass is a thing of the past when a smart phone can do the job. Social media is very much a part of their lives.

Millenials value immersion in cultural experiences more than mere sightseeing and collecting souvenirs of the places where they have been. Instead of popular tourist destinations, they prefer adventures to exotic places that are usually off-the-beaten-track.

While millennials are not particularly thrilled by frivolous frills, that does not mean they travel cheap. Far from it. They are in fact brand conscious, and would pay for something that they fancy or must try. But they will not spend on stuff that do not value-add their experiences. That way, they can afford more experiences, travelling more frequently.

Millennials are the NOW generation, who are prepared to rough it out if they had to. For them, travel is more a means to an end. They are therefore less likely to complain about not being pampered by the crew on board, but they do expect efficiency and immediacy of result. Hence, the absence of fuss, boosted by technology capability that allows room for them to exercise some degree of control of what they need and want, appeals to them.

It is this new generation of travellers, says Air France, who inspired the formation of Joon which will take to the sky in fall.